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COMPLIANCE WITH THE OVERTIME PAY 
PROVISIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT* 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG and PAUL L. SCHUMANN 
Cornell University University of Minnesota 
I. INTRODUCTION 
PROPOSALS have been periodically introduced into Congress to raise the 
overtime pay premium required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
from time and a half to double time in the hope that, when overtime hours 
were made more expensive, employers would be induced to reduce their 
usage of overtime and to increase their employment levels. That is, 
increasing the overtime premium is thought by some to be a way to 
stimulate employment growth and to reduce unemployment.1 
If the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA are not fully complied with, 
the potential employment gain associated with any increase in the over- 
time premium will be reduced. Furthermore, since an increase in the 
overtime premium would increase the amount employers save by not 
complying with the legislation, such an increase might lead to a decrease 
in the compliance rate. This would further moderate the actual decline in 
overtime hours and the potential positive employment effects resulting 
from an increase in the overtime premium. 
A number of data sources provide some information on compliance 
with overtime legislation. An early U.S. Department of Labor compliance 
survey indicated that 30 percent of the establishments in which overtime 
was worked were in violation of the overtime provisions of the FLSA and 
5.9 percent of the employees working overtime were not paid in accor- 
* Our research was conducted under a contract with the Minimum Wage Study Commis- 
sion; however, the views expressed here are solely our own. A draft of this paper was 
written while Ehrenberg was a visiting professor at Tel-Aviv University. 
1 See Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Paul L. Schumann, Longer Hours or More Jobs? (1982), for 
an overview of the debate on the wisdom of instituting such a policy and a summary of the 
relevant empirical evidence. 
[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXV (April 1982)] 
? 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/82/2501-0004$01.50 
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dance with the overtime provisions.2 More recently, Labor Department 
investigations in fiscal year (FY) 1977 of complaints of violations under 
the FLSA found a greater dollar volume of violations of the overtime pay 
provisions than they did of the minimum wage provisions.3 Finally, data 
from the annual May supplements to the Current Population Surveys 
(CPS) indicate that over the 1973-78 period, less than 43 percent of full- 
time wage and salary workers who worked forty-one or more hours a 
week at one job reported receiving premium pay.4 
Of course, many of the individuals who work long workweeks may 
work in noncovered employment where payment of an overtime premium 
is not required; only 58 percent of all wage and salary workers were 
covered by the overtime provisions of the FLSA in 1978.5 Since one may 
reasonably conjecture that noncovered workers are more likely to work 
overtime, as their marginal costs of overtime hours are lower than those 
of otherwise identical covered workers, the data from the CPS cited 
above should be considered only suggestive and probably overstate the 
extent of noncompliance. Our objective in the next section is to analyze 
more carefully the May 1978 CPS and also the 1977 Michigan Quality of 
Employment Survey (QES) data to obtain estimates of the extent of non- 
compliance with the overtime pay provisions, focusing on workers who 
can be identified with certainty as being covered by and subject to the 
overtime provisions of the FLSA. 
Knowledge of the correlates of noncompliance may well be as impor- 
tant to policymakers as knowledge of the rate of noncompliance. While 
information on the latter may lead them to push for an increase in the 
resources devoted to enforcing compliance or for increases in the penal- 
ties for noncompliance or both, knowledge of the former is useful in 
deciding how the limited resources that the government has to assure 
compliance should be allocated. With this in mind, in Section III we 
describe our attempts to build and estimate a model of the determinants of 
noncompliance with the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA and discuss 
the conclusions that can be drawn from these efforts.6 
2 U.S. Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions, Compliance Survey 1965 (Wash- 
ington, D.C., 1966). 
3 U.S. Dep't Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Minimum Wage and 
Maximum Hours Standards under the Fair Labor Standards Act 1978 (Washington, D.C., 
1978). 
4 George Stamas, Long Hours and Premium Pay, May 1978, 102(5) Monthly Lab. Rev. 41 
(1979). 
5 U.S. Dep't Labor, supra note 3. 
6 Our efforts in this section and the one that follows considerably generalize the work of 
Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law, 87 J. Pol. 
Econ. 333 (1979). 
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Our analyses in Sections II and III deal only with individuals who we 
can identify as being subject to the overtime pay provisions with cer- 
tainty. However, for individuals employed in retail trade and selected 
service industries, coverage under the FLSA is partially based on whether 
the employer's annual sales exceed a critical value, and, at least in the 
CPS data, such information is unavailable. One might speculate that non- 
compliance would be higher among employees subject to the overtime 
provisions in these industries than it would be elsewhere, as both em- 
ployees' knowledge of their rights to receive overtime premiums of time 
and a half and employers' knowledge of their obligations to pay such 
premiums may be lower in these industries- especially in establishments 
whose sales just exceed the critical value. To test this conjecture, one 
must develop a method to estimate the extent of noncompliance in indus- 
tries in which such size-class exemptions exist when data on the size of 
establishment in which each individual is employed are unavailable; this is 
done in Section IV.7 Finally, we briefly summarize the conclusions that 
can be drawn from our efforts. 
II. NEW ESTIMATES OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
The May 1978 Current Population Survey contained data on 11,738 
individuals who reported that they worked forty-one or more hours during 
the survey week for a single employer. It would be incorrect, however, to 
focus on this entire sample when discussing compliance with the overtime 
pay provisions, since there are numerous individuals who are not subject 
to the provisions. These include, but are not restricted to, supervisory 
employees, outside salespersons, employees in seasonal industries (in- 
cluding agriculture), state and local government employees, employees in 
small retail trade and service sector establishments, and some household 
workers. 
Fortunately, it is possible to classify each individual who worked over- 
time as belonging to one of three groups: those who we believe are 
"definitely" subject to the overtime pay provisions; those who we believe 
are subject to the provisions with a known probability; and those who are 
either not subject to the provisions or for whom coverage probabilities 
cannot be determined. The assignment is based on an algorithm which 
makes use of knowledge of the various exemptions to the overtime provi- 
sions of the FLSA, of whether each individual was paid by the hour, and 
of the detailed three-digit census industry and occupation categories in 
which each individual is employed. In the case of individuals employed in 
7 Ashenfelter & Smith, supra note 6, confined their attention to the sector in which 
coverage could be determined with certainty. 
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retail trade and selected service industries, where coverage under the 
overtime provisions was based on whether the establishment's sales ex- 
ceeded $250,000 per year in 1978, each individual was assigned a proba- 
bility of coverage equal to the fraction of employees in the three-digit 
industry who worked in establishments with sales of greater than $250,000 
in 1977.8 The latter information came from published volumes of the 1977 
Census of Retail Trade and the 1977 Census of Selected Service Industries 
as well as from unpublished tabulations that were specially prepared for 
us by the census. 
Details of the algorithm used to assign individuals to the three groups 
are contained in an appendix that is available from us. The procedure 
resulted in our classifying 3,231 individuals as being definitely subject to 
the overtime pay provisions and 535 individuals as being subject to the 
provisions with known probability. It is these two groups, which repre- 
sent 32 percent of the individuals who reported working overtime, that 
we focus our attention on in the paper. This section and the next consider 
the "certain coverage" group, while Section IV considers the "known 
probability of coverage" or "partial coverage" group. 
Individuals in the CPS sample reported whether they received any pre- 
mium pay for overtime hours in excess of forty per week, not what their 
overtime pay premium was. While it is possible to construct an estimate 
of the overtime pay premium for a subset of individuals in the sample, this 
estimate is subject to considerable error. Because of this, we define non- 
compliance in the CPS data as failure to receive any premium pay for 
hours of work greater than forty hours per week. Since receipt of a pre- 
mium of less than time and a half represents noncompliance also, such a 
definition clearly understates the extent of noncompliance.9 
8 The establishment sales size test rose to $275,000 on July 1, 1978, and has increased still 
further since then. However, since the CPS data are for May 1978, the $250,000 figure is the 
correct one to use. 
9 Two problems should be noted with this definition. First, it ignores the possibility that 
the existence of the overtime pay premium may have caused some employers who otherwise 
would have worked their work forces overtime to avoid the use of overtime. Such employers 
would be complying with the legislation, but individuals employed in these firms would not 
be included in our sample. Although we return to this point in the next section, when we 
attempt to estimate whether government resources devoted to increasing compliance reduce 
the probability that an individual will work overtime, it should be understood that non- 
compliance is defined in this section to be conditional on individuals' working overtime. 
Second, there may be some measurement error in the reporting of hours of work. Some 
individuals who reported that they worked more than forty hours per week and failed to 
receive an overtime premium may actually have worked forty hours or less; inclusion of 
these individuals in our sample would cause us to overstate the noncompliance rate. In 
contrast, some individuals who reported that they worked forty hours or less and failed to 
receive a premium may actually have worked more than forty hours; exclusion of these 
individuals from our sample would cause us to understate the extent of noncompliance. 
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TABLE 1 
ESTIMATES OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE OVERTIME PROVISIONS OF THE FLSA: 
COMPLETE COVERAGE SAMPLE (Sample Size) 
MAY 1978 CPS 1977 MICHIGAN 
QES 
Private and Private Private 
NONCOMPLIANCE Federal Only Only 
DEFINED AS: (1) (2) (3) 
1. Failure to receive any 
premium pay for overtime 
(hourly wage sample) 9.6% (3,231) 8.9% (3,046) 
2. Failure to receive a 
premium of at least 1.5 
straight-time wage .. . ... 15.9% (69) 
SouRcEs.--Authors' calculations from 1978 CPS Public Use data tapes; 1977 Michigan QES data 
tapes. 
In Table I we focus on the individuals who we believe are definitely 
subject to the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA and, weighing each 
observation by its sample weight, compute an estimate of noncompliance; 
this is found in column 1. Defining noncompliance as failure to receive any 
premium pay for overtime, we find (row 1) that 9.6 percent of the indi- 
viduals in the sample fell in this category. This number is higher than the 
estimates of noncompliance obtained in the 1965 Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics compliance survey. 
A second source of data on noncompliance is the 1977 Michigan QES. 
The QES is a sample of over 1,500 employed adults, and the premium 
received for overtime work was explicitly reported for those in the sample 
who worked overtime. Unfortunately, most adults in the survey failed to 
work overtime, and, after applying our algorithm to isolate those indi- 
viduals who were subject to the legislation with certainty (including the 
restriction that they were paid on an hourly basis), we wound up with a 
sample of only sixty-nine individuals. Of these individuals, however, al- 
most 16 percent failed to receive a premium of time and a half (col. 3). 
Although this estimate is quite precise, one should not place too much 
faith in its specific value because the sample may not be representative 
due to its small size. Nevertheless, it does suggest that the actual non- 
compliance rate in the complete coverage sector is probably fairly close to 
the lower-bound estimate of 9.6 that we obtained with the CPS data. We 
should reemphasize that the former figure refers to the fraction of those 
While one hopes that these two sources of bias just offset each other, we have no strong 
reason to believe that this will (or will not) be the case. 
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individuals working overtime who failed to receive any premium; it does 
not include those individuals who received overtime pay premiums of less 
than time and a half. To the extent that there are any individuals in this 
latter group, the actual noncompliance rate will be above 9.6 percent.10 
III. THE DETERMINANTS OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
What are the factors that influence the probability that an individual 
who is working overtime and subject to the overtime pay provisions of the 
FLSA will be observed not being paid a premium of at least time and a 
half, as the FLSA calls for? An economic model of noncompliance should 
start from the proposition that an efficient solution requires that non- 
compliance will be observed only when the sum of the net benefits 
(benefits minus costs) to an employer and his employees from non- 
compliance exceeds zero." That is, the gains and losses from non- 
compliance faced by both parties in the employment relationship must be 
evaluated. 
From the perspective of the employer, the benefits from noncompliance 
are the savings that accrue from his failing to pay workers working over- 
time a premium of at least time and a half. The costs to the employer of 
noncompliance include the costs of any increased employee turnover that 
may result from failure to pay legally required premium payments. These 
costs are likely to be higher for skilled workers than they are for unskilled 
workers and for workers that the employer expects (wants) to have long 
job tenure with the firm than they are for workers with short expected job 
tenure. 
The costs of noncompliance also include any costs that would result if 
10 One additional set of results warrants being briefly reported here. Analyses reported in 
the next section suggest that the noncompliance rate was higher in the federal sector than in 
the private sector. Some people may find it inconceivable that federal government agencies 
would fail to comply uniformly with federal legislation. While we do not necessarily agree 
with this view, it is instructive to note that when the analyses are redone excluding federal 
workers (Table 1, col. 2), the results change only marginally. For evidence of federal gov- 
ernment agencies' noncompliance in another area, see George Borjas, Discrimination in 
HEW: Is the Doctor Sick or Are the Patients Healthy? 21 J. Law & Econ. 97 (1978). 
" We are grateful to a referee for stressing the importance of this point to us. For 
example, it might be the case that the benefits from noncompliance exceed the costs as far as 
the firm is concerned, but the costs to workers of not receiving premium pay far exceeds the 
net benefits to the firm. In this, noncompliance might not arise (even though it is in the firm's 
best interest not to comply) because employees could potentially offer to pay the firm to 
comply with the legislation (perhaps by taking a straight-time wage cut or agreeing to 
smaller wage increases) a sum equal to the firm's net benefits from noncompliance. Such an 
arrangement would eliminate the firm's gain from noncompliance and would leave the work- 
ers better off than they would have been if the firm had failed to comply with the legislation. 
Of course, workers can first attempt to reduce the firm's net benefit from noncompliance in 
other ways (see note 13 infra) before resorting to such implicit monetary payments. 
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an employer is caught violating the overtime pay provisions; these costs 
are determined both by the probability of being caught if a violation oc- 
curs and by the expected penalty once a violation is identified. The re- 
sources available to the Employment Standards Administration to enforce 
the provisions of the FLSA are minimal, and only rarely does the agency 
institute investigations on its own.12 More typically, investigations result 
from alleged violations being reported by employees who feel that they 
have not been paid in accordance with the provisions of the act. This 
suggests that the costs of noncompliance that an employer perceives he 
faces will increase as his perception that an employee will report a viola- 
tion increases.13 It also increases with his perception that such a report 
will be investigated. 
Finally, the costs an employer perceives as associated with 
noncompliance depend upon the expected penalty once a violation is 
judged to have occurred. Since the penalty for first-time violators who do 
not falsify their records involves only back payment of the premium pay 
that is owed to workers (without interest), and the typical settlement 
involves repayment of substantially less than 100 percent of the funds that 
are owed, the incentives for firms to comply with the legislation are not 
very high.14 It should not be surprising, then, that we obtained a lower- 
bound estimate of noncompliance of roughly 10 percent in the completely 
covered sector. Indeed, the fact that the noncompliance rate is not sub- 
stantially higher suggests that, while calculations of the benefits and costs 
from noncompliance influence employers' decisions, they are not the sole 
determinants. Other factors, such as the desire not to violate government 
legislation, clearly are important. 
From the perspective of employees, the costs of noncompliance include 
the loss of premium pay they would suffer if the employer failed to pay 
them an overtime premium of at least time and a half, as called for by the 
legislation. The benefits include the possibility that a lower "price" for 
overtime hours would induce an employer to expand his usage of over- 
time hours. If an employer's demand for overtime hours is elastic with 
12 See Ashenfelter & Smith, supra note 6, for background data on these points. 
13 Employees, of course, must make their own calculations of the benefits and costs to 
them of reporting noncompliance. While the obvious benefits include the possibility of 
receiving premium pay for future overtime and back pay to compensate them for their failure 
to receive overtime premium pay in the past, the costs include the possibility that the 
employer will use less overtime in the future and/or that he might attempt to retaliate against 
the "informers" (if he can identify them) by denying them wage increases or promotion 
opportunities or by laying them off or firing them for cause. 
14 For example, in fiscal year 1977, Labor Department investigations discovered $88 
million of overtime pay premium violations, but only $33 million of this total was repaid to 
workers. See U.S. Dep't Labor, supra note 3, at 21. 
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respect to the overtime wage rate, an employee's total labor earnings 
would be higher if the employer fails to comply with the legislation. In this 
case noncompliance would yield net benefits to the employee if the in- 
creased earnings are sufficient to compensate him for his reduction in 
leisure hours. Of course, employees also have preferences with respect to 
the avoidance of violations of government legislation that must be taken 
into account in the analysis. 
To make the discussion a bit more formal, suppose that the net eco- 
nomic benefits that an employer perceives from noncompliance (BE) and 
the net economic benefits that employees perceive from noncompliance 
(Bw) can both be expressed as linear functions of a vector of explanatory 
variables (Z). Let E represent the net effect of the sum of employer and 
employee preferences or tastes for complying with government legisla- 
tion. Then we can write 
ST = (aE + aw)Zi + Ei 
SI = 1 if S* > 0 (1) 
= 0 otherwise. 
Here SP is an unobservable continuous variable that represents the sum 
of the net economic and noneconomic benefits that individual i, who is 
observed working overtime, and his or her employer would receive from 
not complying with the legislation. The aE and 
aw 
represent vectors of 
regression coefficients that indicate the marginal effects of the explan- 
atory variables on the net benefits that the employer and the employee, 
respectively, receive from noncompliance. Since some variables will af- 
fect either the employer's net benefits or the employee's net benefits, but 
not both, some of the coefficients in the vectors aE and aw will be zero. 
Put another way, the variables that affect BE and Bw may well differ. 
Although ST is unobservable, we can arbitrarily scale its cutoff value so 
that, when the sum of the net benefits from noncompliance is greater than 
zero (ST > 0), we observe an individual who is working overtime not 
receiving a premium that is in compliance with the legislation (Si = 1). 
Conversely, if the index is less than or equal to zero (S* < 0), the indi- 
vidual will be observed receiving a premium in compliance with the legis- 
lation (Si - 0). If we further assume that the Ei can be treated as a normally 
distributed random variable that is uncorrelated with the Zi, equation (1) 
represents a probit model of the determinants of noncompliance with the 
overtime premium that can be estimated by standard methods. 
Our data on noncompliance are for individuals, and it is natural to ask 
what variables might enter into Z and influence the probability that a 
worker working overtime, who is subject to the overtime provisions of the 
FLSA, does not receive premium pay in compliance with the legislation. 
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A group of variables that are likely candidates are available in either the 
CPS or QES samples or can be constructed from other sources, and we 
discuss each in turn. The noncompliance rate is expected first to decline 
and then to increase with age of employee. Teenagers have high expected 
turnover rates; this makes it unlikely that employers will heavily invest in 
their training and thus that any increase in their turnover rates induced by 
noncompliance will be costly to the firm. As new entrants, teenagers are 
also less likely to be aware of the overtime provisions of the FLSA and 
this, along with their high turnover rates and short tenures, makes it 
unlikely that they would report any violation and ask for a compliance 
investigation. Thus the noncompliance rate will likely be high for teens. 
Now, as individuals age and develop "permanent" attachment to firms, 
they accumulate both considerable firm-specific knowledge and knowl- 
edge of the FLSA's provisions. Noncompliance with the overtime provi- 
sions for these individuals will be costly for the firm; it would be costly to 
replace them if they quit, and the probability that a FLSA violation will be 
reported by them is high. However, after some point in time workers 
become "locked in," their earnings with their current employer exceed 
their earnings potential elsewhere because of the firm-specific knowledge 
they have accumulated. This reduces the probability that they will quit in 
response to noncompliance, which reduces the costs of noncompliance 
that employers face. These arguments suggest that the noncompliance 
rate should first decline and then increase with age. 
Turning next to the role of an employee's sex, we find that there are two 
conflicting forces at work on the employer. On the one hand, females have 
historically had higher turnover rates and lower expected tenure than 
males and thus received less firm-specific training. This implies that any 
noncompliance-induced resignations by them would be less costly to firms 
than resignations by males; as a result, noncompliance rates for females 
might be expected to be higher than those for males. On the other hand, in 
a world of growing litigation, employers may be concerned that failure to 
pay females the legally required premiums would lead to the possibility of 
sex-discrimination suits; women may be more likely to report non- 
compliance for this reason,15 and this should reduce the noncompliance 
rate for females. The net effect of these two forces is indeterminate. 
Discrimination against nonwhites or Hispanics may manifest itself in 
higher noncompliance probabilities for individuals from these groups. The 
fact that some Hispanics are not fluent in English and thus may not be 
fully aware of the legislation reinforces this effect, as does the possibility 
that some may be undocumented workers who would be unlikely to com- 
15 See note 13 supra. 
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plain to authorities about violations of the FLSA. Of course, fear of 
litigation, or government compliance activities that are targeted at non- 
whites, might reduce the noncompliance rates for the group. 
Highly skilled individuals are likely both to be costly for firms to replace 
if they quit and also to be fully aware of their legal rights. As such, higher 
education levels should be associated with lower noncompliance rates, 
other things equal. Individuals earning high-wage rates, other things 
equal, are likely also to have the same characteristics. However, here the 
firm also has an incentive not to comply, other things equal, since, as an 
individual's wage rate increases, the benefits (premium savings) from 
noncompliance also increase. On balance, one might expect that the 
former effect dominates, and that compliance will increase as employees' 
wage rates increase.16 
Noncompliance is also expected to be lower in unionized environments 
than in nonunion environments. One important role that unions play is to 
monitor employees' working conditions to assure that both collectively 
bargained and legally required conditions of employment are satisfied. 
Not only do unions call violations of legally required conditions to the 
attention of employers, they also are less reluctant than individual 
employees-since they fear retribution less-to call these violations to 
the attention of enforcement agencies. 
The CPS and QES data both contain information on the industry in 
which each individual is employed. Other things equal, one should expect 
that noncompliance rates will be lower in highly concentrated industries 
for two reasons. First, firms in concentrated industries that face relatively 
inelastic product demand curves can increase their product prices when 
faced with having to pay an overtime premium, without fear of losing all 
of their sales; this reduces the benefits to noncompliance. In contrast, a 
firm in a highly competitive industry has little control over product price 
and, faced with the legal requirement to pay an overtime premium, may 
achieve greater benefits from noncompliance. 
Second, from the Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand, we know 
that, because the price elasticities of demand faced by firms, in competi- 
tive industries are higher than those faced by other firms, ceteris paribus, 
the wage elasticities of labor demand faced by firms in competitive indus- 
tries will be higher than those faced by firms in other industries. Non- 
compliance would thus likely lead to a greater expansion in the usage of 
overtime hours in these industries than elsewhere. Because of this, the net 
16 Put another way, in structured internal labor markets in which high-wage employees 
have implicit or explicit long-term contracts, noncompliance, if known, might lead to a 
reduced supply of new applicants. This would bid up the straight-time wage the firm would 
have to offer, offsetting any benefits from noncompliance. 
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benefits to employees from noncompliance would be higher in competi- 
tive industries; this should further increase the probability of observing 
noncompliance in competitive industries. 
Finally, we also expect that noncompliance would be lower in areas in 
which greater resources are devoted by the government to assuring com- 
pliance with the FLSA, since the probability of violations being caught 
should be higher in such areas.17 The Employment Standards Administra- 
tion (ESA) provided us with data on the total number of FLSA com- 
pliance actions undertaken and the total FLSA compliance budget for 
each of the ninety local ESA area offices in 1978. From these data we 
were able to aggregate up to state totals, and merge into each CPS indi- 
vidual's record, data on these two measures of compliance activity, each 
deflated by the number of private and federal nonsupervisory workers in 
the state, to approximate compliance activity per worker subject to the 
legislation.18 
How well are these hypotheses borne out by the data? Table 2 presents 
estimates of probit models of the determinants of noncompliance for the 
samples of workers who are subject to the overtime pay provisions of the 
FLSA with certainty in both the 1978 May CPS and 1977 QES. Non- 
compliance is defined in the former survey to be failure to receive any 
premium for overtime hours worked in excess of forty per week, while in 
the latter survey it is defined to be failure to receive a premium of at least 
time and a half. One should remember that the sample size in the latter 
case is extremely small (sixty-nine), and thus it is unlikely that one will 
17 The previous hypothesized effects, save for race, assume that government resources 
devoted to compliance activity are randomly distributed. However, if the government were 
trying to maximize the effectiveness of its compliance activities, it would assign them in such 
a way as to maximize the expected number of violations it would uncover (see Ashenfelter & 
Smith, supra note 6, for an elaboration of this point). So, for example, it would investigate 
primarily low-wage nonunion firms in competitive industries, where violations are likely to 
occur, rather than high-wage union firms in concentrated industries in which violations are 
less likely to occur. Clearly, such a rational assignment of government resources would 
reduce our chances of observing noncompliance being correlated with the other postulated 
"determinants"; Ashenfelter & Smith did find some evidence that compliance resources 
were being assigned nonrandomly. Hence, the empirical estimates we obtain should be 
understood to represent the product of the interactions between employer and employee and 
government assignment of enforcement resources. Of course, given the low level of gov- 
ernment enforcement activity, we would be surprised to see it substantially alter the pattern 
of noncompliance (as opposed to the level). 
18 The state level was the finest geographic breakdown that could be identified in the CPS 
data. Since some local offices served more than one state, it was often necessary to aggre- 
gate data across several states. As a result, the number of individual states, or state aggre- 
gates, for which these totals could be computed is actually thirty-two. We should also note 
that it was impossible to separate out the resources devoted to minimum wage and overtime 
pay violation activities. 
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observe statistically significant relationships in these data. Nevertheless, 
since empirical regularities are less subject to challenge when they are 
replicated in different data bases, we present both sets of estimates. 
The dependent variable in each case is the probit transformation of a 
dichotomous variable that takes on the value of one if the individual failed 
to receive a premium in compliance with the legislation (as defined above) 
and zero otherwise.19 The explanatory variables in the case of the CPS 
data include those described above as well as several other control vari- 
ables. In both data sets, a set of (0, 1) variables are included to capture the 
effect of the major (one-digit) industry group in which the individual is 
employed. Only a subset of the other explanatory variables was available 
in the QES. In particular, since state of residence was not reported in this 
survey, resources devoted to compliance activities in the state could not 
be included in the analyses. 
Quite strikingly, a number of our hypotheses are borne out. Further- 
more, none of the coefficients that is statistically significant is opposite in 
sign to what we would expect. For example, both data bases indicate 
quite clearly that noncompliance rates are significantly lower in firms in 
which unions are present than they are in nonunion firms. Similarly, the 
probability of noncompliance is significantly lower in heavily concen- 
trated industries, such as manufacturing and public utilities, than it is in 
less concentrated industries such as mining, construction, wholesale 
trade, finance, insurance, and real estate. Finally, in accord with our 
expectations, the probability of noncompliance is significantly negatively 
related to an individual's earnings level in the CPS data. 
Other results are supportive of our model, although less clear-cut. An 
increase in the level of government resources devoted to compliance ac- 
tivities in a state does appear to reduce the probability of noncompliance; 
however, this variable is statistically insignificant. The probability of non- 
compliance is significantly higher for nonwhites than whites in the QES 
data, suggesting that discrimination is present and that this effect domi- 
nates over any effect of government enforcement activity. Non- 
compliance is also seen to increase with age. Results not reported here 
suggest this relationship occurs primarily for older workers; other things 
equal, the probability of noncompliance appears to be some 4-6 percent 
19 Our model is of the determinants of noncompliance. Clearly, then, in the case of the 
CPS data, the dependent variable is measured with error. Whenver it takes on the value of 
one (no premium), the legislation is not complied with. However, when it takes on the value 
of zero, this may represent receipt of a premium of time and a half or more (compliance) or 
receipt of a premium of less than time and a half (noncompliance). Such measurement error 
may bias the estimates in Table 2; however, it is unclear in which direction the bias 
will go. 
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higher for workers older than fifty-five than for all other workers. As we 
hypothesized earlier, to the extent that mobility of older workers is lim- 
ited, older workers may be less likely to institute complaints about non- 
receipt of premium pay. Contrary to our prior expectations, however, 
alternative specifications provided no evidence that noncompliance rates 
were also higher for teenagers.20 
Taken together, these results provide support for the view that some 
employers and their employees, at least implicitly, do make conscious 
decisions about whether to comply with the overtime provisions of the 
FLSA-decisions that involve a weighting of the benefits and the costs 
that both parties incur by such an action. While this might suggest to some 
that an increase in the overtime premium, which increased the benefits 
employers receive from not complying with the legislation, would lead to 
an increased noncompliance rate, we should remind the reader that such 
an increase also increases employees' economic incentives to report non- 
compliance. The increased threat of such actions on their part may induce 
employers to reduce noncompliance. Thus, one cannot predict in advance 
what the effect of an increase in the overtime premium on noncompliance 
would be from our results. 
IV. NONCOMPLIANCE IN THE "PARTIAL COVERAGE" SECTOR 
The analyses in the previous two sections were conducted on a sub- 
sample of individuals who, we believe with certainty, were subject to the 
overtime pay provisions of the FLSA. We turn now to the subsample of 
individuals who can only be assigned a known probability of being subject 
to the provisions. In this case, estimates of noncompliance cannot be 
obtained by looking at the proportion of individuals working overtime in 
the group who fail to receive a premium of time and a half (or any pre- 
mium, if our conservative definition of noncompliance is being used). 
Rather, a more indirect method must be used. 
Let C, denote the proportion of workers subject to the overtime provi- 
20 In all of the above, compliance is defined conditional on the individual's working 
overtime. However, the existence of the overtime premium and efforts to enforce com- 
pliance with the premium may reduce the probability that individuals actually work over- 
time. If this occurs, the estimates in Table 2 may be subject to sample-selection bias; we may 
confound the effect of an explanatory variable on the probability of noncompliance with its 
effect on the probability of working overtime. See James Heckman, Sample Selection Bias 
as a Specification Error, 47 Econometrica 153 (1979). Using data on the individuals in the CPS 
who both did and did not work overtime, we attempted to correct for this problem by 
estimating a model in which the probability of working overtime and the probability of not 
receiving a premium were simultaneously determined. Unfortunately, such an approach 
yielded very few significant coefficients, probably because it is a difficult model to specify 
accurately. 
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sions of the FLSA in industry i. We assume that this is equal to the 
proportion of individuals in each of the retail trade and service industries 
who are employed in establishments with annual sales of at least $250,000 
in 1977. Let Pic equal the probability that a worker subject to the overtime 
provisions who works overtime in industry i does not receive a premium 
in compliance with the legislation and Pin = the comparable probability 
for workers not subject to the legislation. In fact, Pic is the noncompliance 
rate, the variable which we seek to estimate. It is straightforward to see 
the probability that an individual working overtime in industry i is not 
getting paid a premium in compliance with the legislation (PiA) is given 
by21 
PiA = PicCi + Pin (1 - Ci) = Pin + (Pic - Pin)C,. (2) 
This is nothing more than a weighted average of the "noncompliance 
rates" of the workers who are subject to and not subject to the legislation, 
with the weights being the proportion of workers subject to and not sub- 
ject to the legislation. Of course, for workers not subject to the legislation, 
the term noncompliance does not denote any violation of law; it simply 
reflects failure to receive the premium called for by the law in the covered 
sector. 
Now suppose, for a moment, that Pic and Pin were constant across 
individuals and industries. That is, the probability that a worker working 
overtime who was subject to (not subject to) the overtime pay provisions 
of the FLSA failed to receive a premium in accordance with the legislation 
did not vary with either characteristics of the individual or the industry. In 
this case, equation (3) can be written 
PiA = Pn + (PC - Pn)C,, (3) 
where Pc and Pn are the constant noncompliance rates of workers subject 
to, and not subject to, the legislation, respectively. 
21Data limitations force us to assume in this calculation that the proportion of employees 
working overtime in an industry who are subject to the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA 
equals the reported proportion of employees in an industry who are subject to the provisions 
(Ci). This assumption may be inappropriate because the usage of overtime hours may vary 
systematically with establishment size (and hence coverage), although it appears impossible 
to specify the direction of this relationship. On the one hand, the usage of overtime may be 
higher in small establishments that are not subject to the legislation because their marginal 
costs of overtime hours are lower. On the other hand, the size-class exemptions to the FLSA 
were instituted because small establishments were successfully able to argue they did not 
regularly schedule overtime hours and that their usage of overtime occurred only in 
emergencies; if this argument is true, the proportionate usage of overtime would increase 
with establishment size. The implication of all this is that we may have measured the 
proportion of employees in an industry working overtime who are subject to the overtime 
provisions with some error; however, it is impossible to determine whether we systemati- 
cally have overstated or understated this proportion. 
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In this situation, it should be clear that if one estimates, for the sample 
of individuals working overtime, the simple linear probability function 
model, 
die; = ao + a1Ci, (4) 
where dij takes on the value of one if individualj in industry i is not paid a 
premium in accordance with the legislation, and the value of zero if he is 
paid a premium, then one can estimate the noncompliance rate for work- 
ers subject to the legislation.22 Specifically, 
P( = 
0o 
+ a^, (5) 
where do and a^, are the estimated values of ao and a,. 
Of course, it is not likely that P,, and Pin are constant across individuals 
or industries or both. The simplest modification is to assume that the 
probability of noncompliance varies in both sectors with the vector of 
variables Z that we discussed in the previous section. Suppose that the 
probabilities that individual j, who is employed in industry i, does not 
receive a premium in compliance with the overtime provisions are given, 
in the two sectors, by 
PiJ = Po(' + PZ,,Z. (6) 
and 
Pi,,n = Pon + PnZ , (7) 
respectively.23 
Substitution of (6) and (7) into (2) then yields, after manipulation that 
the probability that an individual with characteristics Z. in industry i who 
is working overtime fails to receive a premium in compliance with the 
legislation (P.,,) 
is given by 
PiAH = Pon + Pn,,Z + (Po. - Pon)Ci + (P,, - P,,)Z;C,. (8) 
Hence, if one estimates the linear probability function model 
dii = eo + eZ; + e2Ci + e3ZiCi, (9) 
22 While there are well-known statistical problems associated with the linear probability 
model, estimates obtained from it will be unbiased. We use it here both for expository 
purposes and because the more appropriate probit or logit models would not permit us to 
make the necessary linear aggregation across workers subject to and not subject to the 
legislation. 
23 For expository convenience, in what follows we treat Z and its coefficient vector as 
single numbers rather than vectors. However, in our empirical work they are treated as 
vectors. 
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the average noncompliance rate for workers subject to the overtime pay 
provisions of the FLSA in these industries can be obtained from 
PC = ("0 + "2) + (, + 3)Z, (10) 
where Z is the mean value of Z for individuals in the sample who are 
subject to the legislation.24 
Table 3 presents our estimates of the proportion of employees subject 
to the overtime provisions of the FLSA (Ci) in May 1978 for thirty-six 
census three-digit retail trade and service industries.25 The proportion 
varied considerably across industries, ranging from 1.00 for department 
stores to only .04 for barber shops. There were 535 individuals in the May 
1978 CPS sample who worked at least forty-one hours during the survey 
week, reported that they were paid by the hour, were not exempt from the 
overtime provisions for other reasons, and were employed in one of these 
industries. These individuals form our partial coverage sample. 
Estimates of equations (4) and (9) are found in Table 4 and the implied 
estimates of noncompliance with the overtime pay provisions one obtains 
from these results, using equations (5) and (10), are found in Table 5. In 
each case, noncompliance is defined as failure to receive any overtime 
pay premium; the estimates therefore likely understate the true non- 
compliance rate. 
The estimates in Table 4 strongly suggest that noncompliance is higher 
for workers subject to the overtime provisions in the partially covered 
sector than it is for workers in the complete coverage sector, as we earlier 
hypothesized. For example, if we use the simplest model which assumes 
that the probability of noncompliance does not vary with individual or 
industry characteristics, we estimate that 20.2 percent of individuals 
working overtime who are subject to the overtime pay provisions in the 
partially covered sector failed to receive any premium pay for overtime. 
When we generalize the model to allow noncompliance to vary with char- 
acteristics of the individual, the noncompliance rate, evaluated at the 
mean values of the characteristics, rises to 24.5 percent. These estimates 
are substantially higher than the 9.6 percent estimate for noncompliance 
that we observed in the complete coverage CPS sample. 
We can also compute estimates of the proportion of individuals in the 
sample who are not subject to the overtime pay provisions and who did 
not receive any overtime pay premium for overtime hours. These esti- 
24 Actually, one knows only the mean values of Z for all individuals in the sample, and 
these are used in the calculations. 
25 These numbers should more precisely be interpreted as the proportion of employees 
who are not exempt for other reasons (for example, who are not supervisory or outside 
salespersons) who are subject to the overtime provisions. 
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TABLE 3 
ESTIMATED PROPORTION OF EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THE 
OVERTIME PROVISIONS OF THE FLSA, MAY 1978: 
RETAIL TRADE AND SELECTED SERVICE INDUSTRIES 
Census Coverage 
Code Rate Industry Description 
607 .886 Lumber and building material retailing 
608 .701 Hardware and farm equipment stores 
609 1.000 Department and mail order establishments 
617 .872 Limited price variety stores 
627 .870 Miscellaneous general merchandise stores 
628 .922 Grocery stores 
629 .474 Dairy products stores 
637 .324 Retail bakeries 
638 .587 Food stores, not elsewhere classified 
639 .981 Motor vehicle dealers 
647 .764 Tire, battery, and accessory dealers 
648 .784 Gasoline service stations 
649 .826 Miscellaneous vehicle dealers 
657 .731 Apparel and accessories stores, except shoe stores 
658 .540 Shoe stores 
667 .750 Furniture and home furnishings stores 
668 .692 Household appliances, TV, and radio stores 
669 .666 Eating and drinking places 
677 .815 Drug stores 
678 .717 Liquor stores 
679 .887 Farm and garden supply stores 
688 .882 Fuel and ice dealers 
689 .285 Retail florists 
697 .527 Miscellaneous retail stores 
749 .719 Automobile services, except repair 
757 .607 Automobile repair and related services 
758 .607 Electrical repair shops 
759 .511 Miscellaneous repair services 
777 .881 Hotels and motels 
787 .084 Beauty shops 
788 .040 Barber shops 
789 .059 Shoe repair shops 
797 .565 Dressmaking shops 
798 .686 Miscellaneous personal services 
808 .631 Bowling alleys, billiard and pool parlors 
809 .717 Miscellaneous entertainment and recreation services 
SouRcES.--Authors' calculations from unpublished tabulations prepared by the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census from data from the 1977 Census of Retail Trade and 1977 Census of Selected Service Industries. 
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TABLE 4 
OLS NONCOMPLIANCE REGRESSIONs: PARTIAL COVERAGE 
SAMPLE, MAY 1978 CPS* 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONST .642 (7.5) .643 (7.5) -.614 (.9) -.619 (.9) 
Z1 ... .017 (2.6) .018 (2.7) 
Z2 ... .. .014 (.1) .013 (.1) 
Z3 ...... -.344 (1.9) -.357 (2.0) 
Z4 and Z5 ... . 
.. 
-.031 (.1) -.020 (.1) 
Z6 ...... -.437 (1.1) -.438 (1.1) 
Z7 ... ... .082 (1.8) .081 (1.7) 
ziot ...... -.012 (1.2) -.013 (1.2) 
Zl ... ... -.225 (.6) -.247 (.7) 
Z12 ... ... -.336 (1.2) -.333 (1.2) 
C -.440 (3.9) -.447 (3.5) 1.295 (1.4) 1.388 (1.5) 
C*Z1 ... ... -.021 (2.4) 0.022 (2.5) 
C*Z2 ...... .015 (.1) .016 (.1) 
C*Z3 ...... .305 (1.3) .325 (1.4) 
C*(Z4 and Z5) ...... .607 (.1) .053 (.1) 
C*Z6 ...... .549 (1.1) .567 (1.1) 
C*Z7 ...... -.090 (1.5) -.089 (1.5) C*Z lot ...... .002 (.1) .001 (.1) 
C*Zl I ...... -.018 (.0) -.002 (.0) 
C*Z12 ..... .272 (.8) .249 (.7) 
C*Z21 ... 7.546 (.1) ... -82.028 (1.3) 
R2 .028 .028 .136 .139 
NOTE.--N = 535 for all equations. Noncompliance was defined in this table as failure to receive any 
premium pay for hours in excess of forty per week. Numbers in parentheses are absolute value t- 
statistics. 
* See Table 2 for variable definitions. All variables are defined as before save C, which is the estimated 
proportion of employees in the industry subject to the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA (see Table 3). 
t Coefficient multiplied by ten. 
mated noncompliance rates have no normative significance, as these 
workers are not legally required to receive a premium. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to note that they are considerably larger than the non- 
compliance rates for workers in these industries who are subject to the 
legislation. Indeed, our estimates of "noncompliance" for these nonsub- 
ject workers is 64.2 percent when the probability of receiving a premium 
is assumed not to vary with individuals' characteristics and 48.5 percent 
when it is assumed to vary. 
One might be tempted to conclude from these estimates that a reason- 
able estimate of the effect of the FLSA on the probability that workers in 
these industries who are subject to the overtime provisions are paid a 
premium is the difference between the proportions receiving premium 
pay in both sectors. Our estimates would imply then that the FLSA has 
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TABLE 5 
ESTIMATES OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE OVERTIME PROVISIONS OF THE FLSA: PARTIAL 
COVERAGE SAMPLE, MAY 1978 
PModel Covered Sct r (%) Noncovered Se P 
Model Covered Sector (%) Noncovered Sector (%) 
1. Noncompliance constant 
within each sector 20.2 64.2 
2. Noncompliance varies 
within each sector with 
characteristics of the 
individual 24.5 48.5 
SOURCE.--Authors' calculations based on the May 1978 CPS Public Use data. Based on the regression 
results found in Table 4, cols. I and 3. 
increased the probability that a worker receives premium pay for over- 
time by between twenty-four (48.5-24.5) and forty-four (64.2-20.2) per- 
centage points. 
Such a conclusion would be incorrect, however, for at least two rea- 
sons. First, the presence of a covered sector may well affect the probabil- 
ity that establishments in the noncovered sector pay an overtime pre- 
mium.26 Thus, estimates of the difference between noncompliance rates in 
the covered and noncovered sectors tells us little about the effect of the 
legislation on the probability that workers subject to the legislation are 
paid a premium. Second, independent of the above problem, there is no 
reason to presume that the probability that noncovered (small) establish- 
ments pay a premium is an accurate estimate of the probability that cov- 
ered (larger) establishments would pay an overtime premium in the ab- 
sence of the legislation. Our estimates simply cannot be used to infer 
anything about the quantitative effect of the FLSA on the proportion of 
workers receiving premium pay for overtime in this sector. 
Finally, one can recover estimates of the marginal effects of the various 
26 One might argue that, as the proportion of individuals covered by the legislation in- 
creases, the noncompliance rate in this sector will fall, since both employees and employers 
will be more likely to be aware of their being subject to the legislation. In addition, if labor 
markets are at all competitive, one could hypothesize that an increase in the proportion of 
workers subject to the legislation would increase the probability that employers not subject 
to the legislation would have to pay overtime premiums to attract workers. While it would be 
desirable to test these hypotheses, if one allows both Pn and P, to vary with C, the resulting 
estimating equation would be underidentified and one would not be able to obtain an esti- 
mate of either P(, or P,. We did estimate some equations in which only PC was allowed to 
vary with C. While these equations yielded estimates of P(, that were higher than those in Table 5, one can show that, if the probability that premium pay for overtime is received in the 
noncovered sector increases with C, then such estimates of PC will be biased upward. 
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TABLE 6 
IMPLIED PARTIAL DERIVATIVES* 
OLS NONCOMPLIANCE RESULTS, PARTIALLY COVERED SAMPLE 
Expected 
Impact Variable 6P I Z 
- then + Zi Age -.004 (1.3) 
Z2 Sex (1=male) .029 (.4) 
? Z4 & Z5 Race (1=nonwhite) .033 (.3) 
+ Z6 Hispanic (1= yes) .129 (.7) 
Z7 Education -.008 (.4) 
Z10 Earnings -.012 (2.3) 
Z12 Union -.084 (.8) 
Z22 Compliance activity -82.028 (1.3) 
* Derived from the estimates in col. 4 of Table 4. Numbers in parentheses are absolute value t- 
statistics. 
explanatory variables on the noncompliance rate for workers subject to 
the overtime pay provisions in this sample from 
&PCIZ = (A, + A3). (11) 
These estimates are presented in Table 6 for a number of the explanatory 
variables; their expected signs are summarized in the first column. Al- 
though most of these effects prove not to be statistically significantly 
different from zero, perhaps because of the smaller sample sizes in the 
partially covered sample, it is gratifying to observe that the pattern of 
effects is quite similar to that which we observed in the complete coverage 
CPS sample. In particular, the noncompliance rate in this sector is higher 
for males than females and for nonwhites than whites, is lower for union 
members than nonunion members, and declines with an individual's 
earnings and education level and with the level of resources that the 
government devotes to compliance activity. Each of these relationships 
was also observed in the complete coverage sample. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests that non- 
compliance with the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA is a nontrivial 
problem. Our analyses of the May 1978 CPS data indicated that at least 
9.6 percent of individuals who worked more than forty-one hours in the 
survey week and who we believe were subject to the FLSA's overtime 
provisions with certainty failed to receive any premium pay for overtime 
hours. Moreover, from our analyses of the partial coverage CPS sample, 
we inferred that over 20 percent of the people working overtime who were 
OVERTIME PAY PROVISIONS 181 
subject to the overtime pay provisions in those industries in which size- 
class exemptions existed failed to receive any premium. Finally, our 
analyses of the 1977 Michigan QES data indicated that almost 16 percent 
of the individuals who worked overtime and who we believe with cer- 
tainty were covered by the overtime provisions failed to receive a pre- 
mium of time and a half. Together, these analyses strongly suggest that 10 
percent would be a highly conservative estimate of the noncompliance 
rate with the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA. Such a non- 
compliance rate would substantially moderate the positive employment 
effects generated by any future increase in the overtime premium. 
Our analyses also provide some support for the view that decisions 
about whether to comply with the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA 
are at least partially based on the benefits and costs that are associated 
with noncompliance. To the extent that increasing the overtime premium 
would increase the benefits employers perceive from noncompliance, this 
might lead to an increase in noncompliance. If this occurs, the employ- 
ment effects of an increase in the premium would be further moderated. Of 
course, an increase in the overtime premium would also increase em- 
ployees' economic incentives to report noncompliance to enforcement 
authorities. The increased threat of such actions on their part might induce 
employers to reduce noncompliance. Thus, our results unfortunately do 
not permit us to predict what the effect of an increase in the overtime 
premium on noncompliance would be. 
